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EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS AND WRONGS: ADA
ISSUES IN THE 2001-2002 SUPREME COURT TERM
Barbara K. Bucholtz*
The Supreme Court's decision-making is beginning to fall into a discernible
pattern. That is to say, in recent Terms, many opinions have followed the same
analytical strategy so that we can begin to anticipate not only the outcome, in a
certain type of case, but also the analytical route by which the outcome will be
reached. The pattern is evident in cases that broaden the application of the most
controversial and narrowly decided Rehnquistian precedents. By using carefully
selected rules of statutory construction, the Court has been able to extenuate the
polemical nature of those precedents and to enlarge the range of circumstances to
which they apply. Statutory construction, considered the most technical, neutral,
and deferential ground for interpreting and applying law, has become an effective
vehicle for the Court's conservative activism and a subtle method for advancing its
conservative agenda.
This pattern stands in stark contrast to the use the Rehnquist Court made of
these interpretive rules in its early years. Then, it evinced a different kind of
conservatism: one characterized by judicial restraint. In its early years, the
Rehnquist Court enjoyed a reputation for deciding ideologically divisive cases on
narrow grounds. It selected rules of statutory construction to maintain
jurisprudential stability and to build consensus. In recent Terms, statutory
construction has metamorphosed into a tool for ideological activism. Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA") cases in the Court's 2001-2002 Term illustrate the
strategy.
I. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The Court rendered several important workplace discrimination decisions
this Term, but one closely watched case was a "non-starter" which surprised some
observers and disappointed others. The Court granted writ of certiorari to
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta2 in 1994 to address the constitutionality of a
federal affirmative action program administered by the Department of
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. See Barbara K. Bucholtz, Gestalt Flips by an Acrobatic Supreme Court and the Business-Related
Cases on its 2000-2001 Docket, 37 Tulsa L. Rev. 305, 308-09 (2001).
2. 512 U.S. 1288 (1994).
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Transportation ("DOT") under its Small Business Act ("Act") highway
construction program.3 This was the third time the Court reviewed the case.
In Adarand I, the Court reviewed a challenge to the DOT's affirmative
action program under the Act. The program gave priority in highway
construction projects for "a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise" ("DBE").5 A
business was certified as "disadvantaged" if it was owned or controlled by socially
or economically disadvantaged groups including "Black Americans, Hispanic
Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other
minorities ....6 Randy Pech, Adarand's principal who was a white male, brought
the suit, alleging the program was discriminatory on the basis of race in violation
of the Federal Government's Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.7 In
1990, Adarand Constructors submitted the low bid for a guardrail job on a federal
highway construction project, but because of the DOT affirmative action program
the job was awarded to a Hispanic contractor.8
The Court held that the program should be analyzed under a strict scrutiny
standard (establishing a presumption that all racially discriminatory programs
violate the Fifth Amendment) and remanded the case for analysis pursuant to that
ruling.9 On remand, the District Court found the program did not survive strict
scrutiny.'0 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that the issue was moot because
DOT had certified Adarand as a DBE in the intervening period of time.1 When
the Supreme Court addressed the Tenth Circuit ruling, it found the record
inadequate and reversed and remanded the case again for development of the
record and a reapplication of its strict scrutiny test to the supplemented record. 2
On remand, and in response to the expanded record, both the District Court and
the Tenth Circuit found that the program could not pass the strict scrutiny test
mandated in 1997.
The Tenth Circuit also looked at the revised regulations, which were put in
place by the Clinton Administration pursuant to its "'mend it, don't end it"'
strategy, for preserving core aspects of its affirmative action program. 3 The Tenth
Circuit found that those regulations14 posed no Fifth Amendment problem.15 Pech
3. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); see Pub. L. No. 87-305, 75 Stat. 666,
667-68 (1961) (as enacted 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(i) (2000)).
4. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. at 205-06.
5. Id. at 209.
6. Id. at 205; see 75 Stat. at 667-68 (as amended 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(i)).
7. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 169 F.3d 1292, 1296-97 (10th Cir. 1999). Adarand, 515 U.S.
at 205-06. For a detailed discussion of the case, see Barbara K. Bucholtz, Private Sector Issues in a
Public Sector Retro-lution: The Supreme Court's Business-Related Decisions in the October 1999 Term,
36 Tulsa L.J. 153, 168-69 (2000).
8. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205.
9. Id. at 237-38.
10. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Colo. 1997).
11. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 169 F.3d at 1296-97.
12. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 224 (2000) (per curiam).
13. David G. Savage, Adarand Didn't Add up, 88 ABA J. 26 (Jan. 2002).
14. 49 C.F.R. § 26 (1999) (promulgated pursuant to the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st
Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, § 1101(b)(1), 112 Stat. 107, 113 (1998)).
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again appealed the case to the Supreme Court, seeking a definitive ruling against
the affirmative action program. In March, 2001, the Court obliged by granting
Pech's petition for writ of certiorari. The Court reviewed the certified record and
found that Pech's challenge covered issues not raised in the lower courts" and
resolved that the petition should be "dismissed as improvidently granted."" v Thus,
the Court refused to pull the trigger on an affirmative action program, originally
found to be subject to strict scrutiny, but not amenable to review under the
circumstances." This was also the case with the affirmative action program at the
University of Texas where, in Texas v. Hopwood,'9 the Court refused to hear a
subsequent appeal after the University revised its program.
While opponents of affirmative action were disappointed by the Court's
refusal to view Adarand as an opportunity to end race-based affirmative action
definitively, they should not have to wait long for another opportunity. The Court
will undoubtedly be asked to review other affirmative action programs and to
reach the ultimate issue shortly.2° By contrast, the Court had no trouble reaching
definitive resolution of disputes brought under an anti-discrimination statute.
II. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
All sides agree that the ADA" is a difficult statute to interpret because it is
replete with ambiguities. Over the last several Terms, the Court has, for the most
part, attempted to resolve those ambiguities in ways that narrow its application.
An exception was the 1998 case of Bragdon v. Abbott,2 where the Court held that
an individual who tested positive for HIV was protected by the provisions of the
ADA.23 However, in the following (1998-1999) Term the Court held in Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc.,24 that the threshold standard for ADA protection (a
"physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of an individual") should be interpreted to exclude impairments
15. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1157-59 (10th Cir. 2000). The Tenth Circuit
also found Pech and his company either lacked standing or waived any right to challenge these
programs. Id. at 1160.
16. The Court found that Pech was challenging not the federal law pertaining to procurement of
federal funds for federal projects directed by states-the law under review by the Court of Appeals on
remand, but the federal law pertaining to direct procurement of federal highway construction funds for
DOT projects on federal lands-which the Court of Appeals did not consider. The Court declared
that "ordinarily [it would] not decide in the first instance issues not decided below" and, further, that it
would not examine sua sponte a lower court ruling that Pech lacked standing, and dismissed the writ of
certiorari. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103,108 (2001) (per curiam).
17. Id. at ill.
18. Id. at 109.
19. 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
20. Commentators point to the case involving two affirmative action programs at the University of
Michigan. The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari in Grutter v. Bollinger, 2002 WL 1968753
(S. Ct. Dec. 2, 2002).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
22. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
23. Id. at 655.
24. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
2002]
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which, like myopia, can be corrected." Sutton also declared that it is not an ADA
violation for employers "to establish physical criteria" as job qualifications even
though the criteria could serve as an automatic bar to applicants with an
impairment.
26
In the 1998-1999 Term, the Court also decided Albertson's, Inc. v.
Kirkingburgf which built upon Sutton and fueled its interpretive momentum.
The Court held that a disability or impairment, like monocular vision, which can
be compensated for by the impaired employee himself (according to the Court, an
employee's sightlessness in one eye is accommodated or counterpoised by his
other eye's vision) is not an impairment requiring ADA protection.28 In a third
case that Term, Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,29 the Court ruled that the
impairment must disqualify an employee or job applicant from a "broad range of
jobs," not just a particular job. ° In Murphy, the job at issue required the applicant
to meet federal standards for driving commercial vehicles. He could not meet the
standards because of his high blood pressure.3' "At most," said the Court,
"petitioner has shown that he is regarded as unable to perform the job of
mechanic only when that job requires driving a commercial motor vehicle-a
specific type of vehicle used on a highway in interstate commerce. 32 The Court
also decided that a collective bargaining agreement purporting to require that
discrimination claims be arbitrated did not waive the employee's statutory right to
a judicial forum, as the language of the waiver was not "clear and unmistakable";
thus, ADA litigation was not precluded.33 Finally, in Cleveland v. Policy
Management Systems Corporation,34 the Court considered whether a suit could be
brought under the ADA by an individual who made statements on an application
for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits that she was unable to work.35
In the 2000-2001 Term, the Court, again narrowed the Act's reach with
regard to three diverse ADA issues. In Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett,6 five Justices applied their burgeoning federalism doctrine to
hold that state employees were barred from suing state employers because of the
Eleventh Amendment protection of sovereign immunity.37 In Buckhannon Board
25. Id. at 482 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (emphasis in original).
26. Id. at 490-91.
27. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
2& Id. at 565-67.
29. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
30. Id. at 523 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)-(3)(i) (1998)).
31. Id. at 519.
32. Id. at 524.
33. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 79-81 (1998).
34. 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
35. Id. at 806. For a more complete discussion of these cases, see Barbara K. Bucholtz, Business as
Usual in a "Dollar Democracy ": A Review of Business-Related Cases in the 1998-1999 Supreme Court
Term, 35 Tulsa L.J. 485, 489 (2000).
36. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
37. Id. at 360. Although Garrett narrows ADA's coverage by denying state employees access to the
Courts, undoubtedly its principles will be applied to bar litigants with claims under analogous federal
[Vol. 38:363
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and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human
Resources,38 the issue was whether a plaintiff-employee could avail himself of the
ADA's fee-shifting statutes by showing that the lawsuit was based on the "catalyst
theory" which caused the employer to change its conduct. In Buckhannon, the
employer changed its conduct prior to adjudicatory resolution of the case.39 Prior
to Buchhannon, the majority of circuits permitted plaintiffs to use the "catalyst
theory" to establish "prevailing party" status in similar cases as support for costs
and fees applications n.4  Buckhannon ruled that fee-shifting is only available if
judicial resolution of the case created the change.4' By rejecting the dominant
circuit court view, the Court foreclosed the availability of ADA remedies to many
employees. Justice Ginsberg pointed out in her dissent that many litigants rely on
the broader view of the catalyst theory to ensure that they can retain effective
counsel without the risk that the employer can escape fee-shifting exposure by
affecting a voluntary compliance (gotcha) posture prior to judicial resolution.
The third case brought under the ADA in the 2000-2001 Term received the
most media attention, although it will doubtless have the least impact on ADA
jurisprudence. Its high profile owes much more to the popularity of the sports
event at issue than to the legal issue it addressed. In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,n3
the Court held that a competitor in a golf tournament was entitled to an ADA
disability accommodation (in this case, the use of a motorized golf cart to traverse
the golf course) because it did not "fundamentally alter the nature" of the
tournament. 44 "Fundamentally alter" is one of a number of ambiguous concepts in
the Act that invite litigation.
In the most recent Term, the Supreme Court addressed the ambiguity of
core concepts in the Act in three of the four ADA cases it decided.45 The first of
46these cases, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, required
the Court to revisit some of the threshold coverage issues it addressed in the 1999
cases of Sutton, Murphy, and Albertsons. In Toyota, the Court had to decide if a
plaintiff-employee's carpal tunnel syndrome and related afflictions were
disabilities covered by the ADA because they "substantially limit[ed her] ...
civil rights statutes. For a more complete discussion of this case and other employment cases decided
in the 2000-2001 Term, see Bucholtz, supra n. 1, at 309-13.
38. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
39. Id. at 600.
40. For a more comprehensive discussion of Buckhannon, see Bucholtz, supra n. 1, at 325-26.
41. 532 U.S. at 605.
42. Id. at 622 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For a more comprehensive discussion of Buckhannon, see
Bucholtz, supra n. 1, at 325-26; Marcia Coyle, Some in Congress Seek to Restore "Catalyst" Fees, Natl.
L.J. A8 (Sept. 16, 2002) (reporting that there are now two bills in Congress, H.R. 5179 and S. 106,
which abrogate Buckhannon).
43. 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
44. Id. at 683.
45. In the order in which the opinions were rendered, they are: Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams, 122 S. Ct. 681 (2002); U.S, Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002); Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002); Barnes v. Gorman, 122 S. Ct. 2097 (2002).
46. 122 S. Ct. 681.
2002]
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major life activities. 47  A unanimous Court held that they were not.48 In so
holding, the Court clearly attempted more precisely to define these core ADA
concepts. But as the following analysis reveals, the devil was in the details.
A. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams
Ella Williams, who had been employed for several years at the same job at
defendant's automobile manufacturing plant, was required to use pneumatic tools
in her work. After several years at the same job, she developed bilateral carpal
tunnel syndrome, tendonitis, and other related physical problems. 9 She was
advised by her doctor to avoid tasks that would exacerbate the afflictions, such as
frequent lifting and carrying, repetitive motions engaging wrists and elbows, and
the use of vibrating instruments.50 The employer responded to her condition by
assigning her to a vehicle inspection team. For three years, she attended to the
tasks of inspecting cars "for defective paint and manually wiping down each newly
painted car as it passed on the conveyor.
51
During that time, her condition was not aggravated by the work. Some time
later, she was also required to wipe down each vehicle with "highlight oil," a task
which required her "to grip a block of wood with a sponge attached to the end and
wipe down the passing cars.., at the rate of approximately one car per minute.,1
2
Because this task required her to engage in repetitive motions and to keep her
arms at shoulder level for extended periods of time, it aggravated her infirmities,
at which point she asked for an accommodation to be reassigned to her previous
inspection job 3 Williams alleged that the employer refused to reassign her and
that this refusal ultimately led to her termination.5 4 After receiving her EEOC
right to sue letter, Williams filed a lawsuit against her employer asserting a claim
under the ADA.55 Thus, the ADA issue before the trial court was whether the
56employer's refusal to accommodate her condition violated the Act. The trial
court granted the employer summary judgment on the ADA claim, finding that
Williams' condition did not qualify as a covered "disability.
57
The ADA protects a "qualified individual with a disability" which is to say
"an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires."58 "Disability" is defined by the Act, in relevant part,
47. Id. at 686 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)).
48. Id. at 692.
49. Id. at 686.
50. Id.




55. Toyota Motor, 112 S. Ct. at 687.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 687-88.
58. Id. at 689 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)).
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as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.,
59
The dispute on the motion for summary judgment focused on subsection
(A): Were Williams' carpal tunnel syndrome and related physical infirmities
impairments that substantially limited any of her major life activities? Williams
argued that her condition met the characteristics of a "disability" described in
subsection (A) because her condition prohibited her from performing manual
tasks (like the repetitive lifting and reaching tasks which aggravated the
condition), 6° household chores (housework, gardening, playing with children, etc.),
lifting, and working.6" The trial court, in granting the employer's motion for
summary judgment, found that these physical impairments did not constitute a
"disability" because (1) the household work she identified was not a major life
activity; (2) the manual tasks she identified in her work assignments (along with
"lifting and working") were major life activities, but the evidentiary record did not
sustain her claim that she was "substantially limited in lifting or working"; and (3)
her evidence that she was substantially limited in performing the manual tasks at
issue was "irretrievably contradicted" by evidence that she performed tasks on the
inspection team without difficulty.2 The Sixth Circuit reversed that ruling.63
Noting the Act's lack of clarity and relying upon Sutton's attempt to resolve
the ambiguities of subsection (A), the Sixth Circuit, found that Williams' evidence
met the Sutton requirement. The Court noted that the inability to perform the
manual tasks at issue constituted more than the skills for a particular job, but
rather included a range of jobs. The Sixth Circuit found Williams met that
requirement because:
Her ailments are analogous to having missing, damaged or deformed limbs that
prevent her from doing the tasks associated with certain types of manual assembly
line jobs, manual product handling jobs and manual building trade jobs (painting,
plumbing, roofing, etc.) that require the gripping of tools and repetitive work with
hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time.
64
Accordingly, said the court, her manual task claim must survive summary
judgment, and because it did, the Sixth Circuit did not believe the trial court
needed to decide whether her work itself qualified as a "major life activity." It
read Sutton and the EEOC regulations to say that working should "be viewed as a
residual life activity, considered, as a last resort, only 'if an individual is not
substantially limited with respect to any other major life activity.' 65 Furthermore,
it expressly refused to consider her household chores as "major tasks," opining
59. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)) (emphasis added).
60. Toyota Motor, 224 F.3d at 843.
61. Toyota Motor, 122 S. Ct. at 687.
62. Id. at 688.
63. Toyota Motor, 224 F.3d at 845.
64. Id. at 843.
65. Id. (quoting Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492) (emphasis original).
2002]
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that the relevant inquiry was not whether Williams could perform "isolated,
nonrepetitive" personal hygiene tasks or household chores, but whether her
condition prevented her from performing the kind of "manual tasks" involved in
66her assigned tasks at work. In sum, the Sixth Circuit ruled that her impairment
was a covered disability and it reversed and remanded the lower court's ADA
ruling, noting that "Williams must still demonstrate the remainder of her prima
facie case, and ... defendant is still free to raise any viable defenses as to why it
was unable to accommodate Williams, such as undue hardship and business
necessity.,
67
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's ADA ruling. In so doing, it
relied on a number of sources, but primarily on EEOC regulations, legislative
history, and its own precedent (Sutton). First, wrote Justice O'Connor, the EEOC
regulations have defined "substantially limited" to mean:
"[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform"; or "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in
the general population can perform that same major life activity."' 68
Then she concluded that this regulation should be construed narrowly
because Congress intended the Act to cover only a small percentage of disabled
61people. Surely, she inferred, because that number represents only a fraction of
disabled citizens, the class covered by the Act was similarly limited.
Then, Justice O'Connor turned to Sutton as additional support for her
narrow reading. "Sutton said only that when the major life activity under
consideration is that of working, the statutory phrase substantially limits
requires.., that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of
jobs."7° Sutton, she declared, did not hold that working was a major life activity; it
did not decide that "difficult question." It merely stated that, assuming working
was a major life activity, then plaintiff would be required to show an incapacity to
perform a "broad range" of jobs, not just a particular job.7' Thus, and in accord
with EEOC regulations, the concept of a "broad range" or "class" of skills
pertains only to the putative concept of "working."72 The Sixth Circuit's error,
continued O'Connor, was in applying the concept to the range of tasks associated
only with Williams' job.73 The Sixth Circuit's focus was misplaced. It was not
those tasks that constituted major life activities, but rather the "household chores,
66. Toyota Motor, 224 F.3d at 843.
67. Id. at 844.
68. Toyota Motor, 122 S. Ct. at 690 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2001)).
69. Id. at 691 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) which states that Congress "found that [only] some
43,000,000 Americans [in 1990 had] .. one or more physical or mental disabilities").
70. Id. at 692 (quoting Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 693 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)).
73. Toyota Motor, 122 S. Ct. at 693.
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bathing, and brushing one's teeth [that] are among the types of manual tasks of
central importance to people's daily lives ....
Justice O'Connor also emphasized that the analysis will require a case-by-
case "individualized assessment." 5 The major life activities in Williams' case were
brushing her teeth, washing her face, bathing, tending her flower garden, fixing
breakfast, doing laundry and "pick[ing] up around the house," tasks which
Williams could perform. While household and personal tasks she could not
perform: sweeping, dancing, driving long distances, and restricted activities like
playing with her children and gardening were not "of central importance to most
people's daily lives.
7 6
The foregoing recitation of this adjudication odyssey, the extensive recitation
of the pre-litigation facts, and the procedural history of the case seemed necessary
for gleening some understanding of the case and its import. First, without
question this is a decidedly pro-business decision. Not surprisingly, "the business
community cheered the decision., 7  Indeed, business has much to celebrate-
undoubtedly this case raises the bar and forecloses an ADA remedy for many
employees with similar "nontraditional injuries." But it is also important to notice
that the victory celebrated by the business community is far from total. As one
commentator explained, the strategy in Toyota Motor was not simply to win that
particular lawsuit, but to effect a result which would "clos[e] the courtroom door"
to these kinds of cases and it aimed at "'keeping the lid on ADA litigation.'
78
This, the O'Connor opinion failed to do. "'The definition of disability is the
ballgame,"' announced two commentators.7 9
As the fact-specific reasoning in Justice O'Connor's opinion attests and as
her "individualized assessment" rule mandates, the case may open almost as many
doors as it closes. If driving long distances is not a major life activity, is driving
short distances a major life activity? And if it is not, how short is short? What if
an individual is capable of performing part of the tasks associated with fixing
breakfast (putting eggs in boiling water, for example) but incapable of performing
other tasks (picking up a pot of boiling water, for example). What about caring
for one's children? Is the capacity to pick-up and carry a child a major life
activity? Is it of central importance to people's lives? Are these not the questions
that, because of O'Connor's analysis, invite resolution by juries? In that regard,
might subsection (C) of the statute (that a disability also includes afflictions that
are so "regarded") require jury resolution?8 ° What about the act of working itself
(the issue the Court admits to ducking in both the Sutton case and in Toyota
Motor)?
74. Id.
75. Id. at 692.
76. Id. at 694.
77. Mary Johnson, Disabling a Civil Right: The Supreme Court Has Made a Decision That Is
Wrongheaded, and Wrong, 274 The Nation 20, 22 (Feb. 11, 2002).
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Samuel Issacharoff and Justin Nelson).
80. Toyota Motor, 122 S. Ct. at 687 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (emphasis added)).
2002]
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Given that the ADA is a statute concerned exclusively with discrimination in
the workplace, is resolution of the issue whether "working" is a major life activity
not a critically important, even if "difficult," issue to resolve? 81 As Robert L.
Bosenbaum, arguing for Williams, insisted, "The ADA is about working, the
ability to have a job, a basic American value., 82
A second reason for the extensive iteration of the record in this case is to
show how the ostensibly technical and objective technique of statutory
construction can be used to achieve result-oriented ends, which implicate broad
policy and political issues. This technique permits the Court to engage in judicial
activism in the guise of judicial restraint and deference. Ostensibly the Toyota
Motor decision was reached by means of statutory construction. It expressly
looked at dictionary definitions of important terms to divine their plain meaning;
83
it looked at legislative findings and history to ascertain legislative intent;84 and it
looked deferentially at relevant agency regulations. 8 It also relied heavily on its
own precedent, Sutton. In Sutton, as in Toyota Motor, the Court gave special
emphasis to the fact that Congress stated in the Act that "some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities., 86 Additionally, in
support of its argument that the ADA should be construed narrowly to restrict its
coverage, the Court quoted the majority opinion in Sutton regarding this statistic.87
But overreliance on one statistic in all of the Act's text and its legislative
history can create a kind of "judicial myopia," brought about by a "legislative
myopia" as Justice Stevens pointed out in his Sutton dissent.88 The 43,000,000
figure might reveal itself to be simply a Congressional miscalculation when
additional evidence of legislative intent is considered. Justice Stevens, in his
Sutton dissent, began his own process of statutory construction by noting the
penultimate rule of statutory construction.89  Stevens quoted the Act for its
explicit, if indefinite, statement of congressional "Purpose": "'to provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities. '"' 90
The disability at issue in Sutton was correctable myopia and the issue was
whether such a condition fell within the Act's stated purpose. To paraphrase the
issue, if an individual lost a limb but was able to perform major life activities with
81. Id. at 692.
82. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Try to Determine the Meaning of Disability, N.Y. Times A16 (Nov.
8, 2001) (available at <http://www.nytimes.com>) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Toyota Motor, 122 S. Ct. at 691-92 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary and
the Oxford English Dictionary for a definition of "substantially" as in "substantially limits" and
Webster's for a definition of "major").
84. Id. at 691.
85. Id. at 689.
86. Id. at 691.
87. Id.
88. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487.
89. Id. at 496 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("As in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to
interpret the words of [the statute] in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve.").
90. Id. at 497 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)).
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the aid of a prostheses, could an employer (consistent with the Act) refuse to hire
him for a job for which he was qualified because he had a prosthesis, because he
had corrected or ameliorated his impairment?9" To answer the question, Stevens
looked beyond the relevant provisions (both the purpose statement 92 and the
Act's definition of "disability" 93 ) to the legislative history, specifically the Senate
report. 94 That report unequivocally stated that "'whether a person has a disability
should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such
as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids."' 95 And he added that "All of
the Reports, indeed, are replete with references" to that interpretation of the Act
(that it was designed to cover correctable disabilities, congressional miscalculation
of the size of the class covered notwithstanding).96 Stevens then turned to relevant
agency interpretation, finding that "each of the three Executive agencies charged
with implementing the Act ha[ve] consistently interpreted the Act as mandating
that the presence of disability turns on an individual's uncorrected state."97
Finally, he quoted EEOC guidelines for the proposition that the determination of
"disability" should be made "'without regard to mitigatingmeasures .... ,
Stevens' conclusion was in accord with the uniform agency and congressional
committee interpretation as well as that of all the circuits which had considered
the issue of a "correctable disability" (with the exception of the Tenth Circuit
from which Sutton arose): 99 that the Act was not designed to exclude individuals
with correctable impairments from its coverage.
What, then, to do with the Court's heavy reliance on the figure of 43,000,000
(identified by the Act as the number of disabled people in 1990)? Stevens
reminded us that, "It has long been a 'familiar canon of statutory construction that
remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes.''°
He added that, in deference to that interpretive approach, the Court has
"consistently construed [anti-discrimination and other remedial statutes like Civil
RICO] to include comparable evils within their coverage, even when the
particular evil at issue was beyond Congress' immediate concern in passing the
legislation. 101  Thus, long-venerated canons of statutory construction do not
compel the narrow reading of "disability" reached in Sutton, in Murphy, in
91. Id.
92. Id. at 499.
93. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 497-99.
94. Id. at 497. Stevens cites Garcia v. U.S., 469 U.S. 70 (1984): "[I]n surveying legislative history we
have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the
Committee Reports on the bill, which represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of those
Congressmen involved in drafting and studying the proposed legislation." Id. at 76 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
95. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 499-500 (quoting Sen. Rpt. 101-16, at 23 (Aug. 30,1989)).
96. Id. at 501.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 501 (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.20) (1998)).
99. Id. at 471 n. 1 (identifying all the circuit courts which had addressed the issue of ameliorated
disabilities).
100. Sutton, at 504 (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)).
101. Id. at 505.
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Albertson's (the 1999 cases addressing the term), and now in Toyota Motor. It is
clear that the Supreme Court chose canons, which seemed to require a narrow
interpretation of the Act. That interpretation allowed the Court to reach a certain
result, a result that consistently and increasingly restricts the Act's coverage.
The policy implications of that interpretation and the impact it will have on
the public are unhappily not so narrow. To the extent that the decisions in Sutton,
Murphy, Albertson's, and Toyota Motor serve to exclude large numbers of
individuals from the workplace, they raise significant questions, not only about
individual rights, but also about the impact on society of excluding otherwise
qualified individuals from the workplace. Undoubtedly, resolution of public
policy concerns triggered by the Court's narrow interpretation of the ADA are
properly within the purview of Congress. Indisputably, the narrow interpretation
by the Court was occasioned by the pervasive ambiguities in the Act. But until
Congressional clarification is forthcoming, the Court should not become a
surrogate legislature. It should return to the posture of judicial restraint it
previously advocated. Toyota Motor, then, is one case which illustrates how the
Court shifts a body of law further to the (political) right by achieving an
(ideologically) right answer under cover of selected canons of statutory
construction °2 and the "normalizing" effect of its own precedent. 103 "But wait," as
the late night television commercials advise, "there's more."
B. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett
In U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,'°4 the second ADA decision rendered this
Term, the Court used statutory construction to resolve a dispute about priorities:
given a conflict between an ADA "reasonable accommodation" and a seniority
system, who holds the trump card? Barnett was a cargo handler at U.S. Airways
and injured his back on the job.' °5 Based on his seniority, he sought transfer to a
mailroom job, which did not exacerbate his back injury.10 6 However, when
another employee with greater seniority bid for his position, the employer elected
to give preference to the senior employee pursuant to the employer's seniority
system.10 7 Barnett was subsequently terminated and he sued under the ADA,
claiming the employer breached its duty to reasonably accommodate him.' ° The
question the Supreme Court addressed was whether the employer's conduct was
permitted under the ADA. The ADA mandates that an employer afford
102. This is not to suggest, however, that the selected use of the canons is a game exclusively played
by the conservatives on the Court; as Karl Llwelyn has pointed out, that game is endemic to the art of
advocacy. See Barbara K. Bucholtz, "Sticking to Business," 34 Tulsa L.J. 207, 207 n. 3 (1999).
103. For example, earlier cases which narrowed the terms at issue in Toyota Motor were decided by a
divided Court: Sutton was decided by a seven-to-two vote, as was Murphy, while Albertson's received
three concurrences. Toyota Motor, relying on this 1999 precedent, was unanimous.
104. 122 S. Ct. 1516.
105. Note that like the impairment in Toyota Motor, Barnett's disability was created on the job, at
the employer's worksite.
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reasonable accommodation to a "qualified" individual.1°9 Accommodation is not
"reasonable" if it would impose an "'undue hardship' on an employer's
business. °  However a "'reasonable accommodation' may include
reassignment... to a vacant position."'11  Most federal appellate courts, in
synthesizing these provisions of the Act in similar situations, have concluded that
the employer must reassign the employee to a position that accommodates his
impairments.1 12 In support of this conclusion, courts have cited the Act, which
defines a "'qualified' disabled individual" as a person "who can perform the job he
or she 'holds or desires.', 113 Courts have also cited the above provision that a
reassignment to a vacant position constitutes a reasonable accommodation.1 4
The circuits have also uniformly held that when the reassignment conflicts
with another "nondiscriminatory employment policy" (like a seniority system)
that has been implemented pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
("CBA"), then the reassignment is not mandated by the ADA. In other words,
the ADA does not compel an employer to contravene the terms of an existing
CBA to accommodate the impaired employee's request for reassignment. 15 But
the issue in U.S. Airways takes this evolving interpretation one step further: If the
seniority policy is not part of a CBA, does it also prevail against an ADA
reassignment? On this issue, the Circuits had been split. 6 For example, the
Seventh Circuit in EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc.,"' held that a
nondiscriminatory company policy trumped a qualified impaired employee's
request for reassignment when she was competing with employees who were more
qualified for the job. 8 But in U.S. Airways, the Ninth Circuit held that a similarly
valid company policy did not work as an absolute bar against an ADA
reassignment.1 9 The court said that it was only one factor that must be considered
on a case-by-case basis. 2 °
The Ninth Circuit grounded its decision primarily by reference to EEOC
guidelines that the ADA requires employers to provide reasonable
accommodations to individuals with disabilities, including reassignment, even
though they are not available to others. Therefore, "[a]n employer who does not
109. Id. at 1520 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12111(8)).
110. U.S. Airways, 122 S. Ct. at 1520 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12111(9)(B)).
111. Michael Starr, Analyzing the ADA, Natl. L.J. A19 (Apr. 1, 2002) (citing Gaul v. Lucent
Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 780, 786 (3rd Cir. 1998); Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automobile, Inc., 141 F.3d
667, 668 (7th Cir. 1998)).
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000)); Felliciano v.
R.L, 160 F.3d 780 (1st Cir. 1998).
114. Id. (citing Davis, 205 F.3d at 1307); Felliciano, 160 F.3d 780.
115. U.S. Airways, 122 S. Ct. at 1533.
116. See Starr, supra n. 111.
117. 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000).
118. Id.
119. 122 S. Ct. 1516.
120. See Starr, supra n. 111 (quoting EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and
Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 3 BNA EEOC Compliance Manual, No.
246, at 5454 (Mar. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Enforcement Guidance]).
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normally transfer employees would still have to re-assign an employee with a
disability... ,121 Further, if an employer has a policy prohibiting transfers, it
would have to modify that policy unless it could show undue hardship.
122
The Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote, rejected the Ninth Circuit
approach. The majority set up a sequence of rebuttable presumptions: first, if a
qualified individual requests a reassignment because of a disability and the
reassignment contravenes a legitimate company policy (like a discrimination-
neutral seniority system), then the policy trumps the employee's ADA request
"ordinarily.' ' 23  That is, once the employer has shown it is entitled to the
presumption because it has met its prima facie burden of demonstrating a
countervailing company policy, then the employee has the burden of defeating the
presumption by showing that the reassignment is a "reasonable
accommodation.' 24 Once the employee has met this burden, the employer "then
must show special (typically case-specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue
hardship in the particular circumstances.,
125
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority declared that this sequence of
presumptions constitutes a "practical view of the statute" which "reconcil[es] the
two statutory phrases ('reasonable accommodation' and 'undue hardship').' 126 In
support of the majority's conclusion, Breyer pointed to time-honored rules of
statutory construction including the plain meaning rule,127 as well as the ADA's
purpose which Justice Breyer characterized as an attempt "to diminish or to
eliminate the stereotypical thought processes, the thoughtless actions, and the
hostile reactions that far too often bar those with disabilities from participating
fully in the Nation's life, including the workplace.' '128  He also cited case law
rulings emanating from lower courts.1
29
Justice Souter authored a dissent in which Justice Ginsberg joined. He
argued that the majority's attempt to reconcile the terms "reasonable
accommodation" and "undue hardship" directly conflicted with the Act's
legislative history. 130 Committee reports from both sides of the aisle stated that
121. U.S. Airways, 122 S. Ct. at 1530 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Enforcement
Guidance, supra n. 120, at N:2479) (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. Id. at 1529. Ideologically speaking, it was an interesting split: Justice Scalia authored a dissent in
which Justice Thomas joined; Justice Souter filed a dissent in which Justice Ginsberg joined. Justices
Stevens and O'Connor filed concurrences. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. U.S. Airways, 122 S. Ct. at 1523.
126. Id. at 1522-23.
127. Id. at 1522 (referencing 43 U.S.C §§ 12101(a)-(b)). Notice that this interpretation of statutory
purpose gives a broad reading to the Act.
128. Id. at 1523 (citing Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 2001) (employee
must show the requested accommodation is "ostensibly feasible"; and "undue hardship" is a
particularized inquiry into the Company's operations)). The Court also cited several appellate cases
that discussed the priority of seniority systems over other statutory rights including Title VII rights and
handicap rights under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 1524.
129. Id. at 1523 (citing Reed, 244 F.3d at 259; Borkowski v. Valley C. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d
Cir. 1995); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
130. U.S. Airways, 122 S. Ct. at 1534 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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seniority systems were to be treated simply as factors in deciding whether a
proposed accommodation was reasonable."' That, of course, was the approach
the Ninth Circuit took. Furthermore, said Souter, Congress had expressly rejected
the approach to seniority systems taken by the Court in Title VII cases. 32 Finally,
Justice Souter took a look at the particular seniority system at issue in U.S.
Airways, one that was not sanctioned by agreement with a union but was simply
company policy. Souter found that Barnett had met the burden imposed by the
majority to demonstrate that the requested reassignment was a "reasonable"
(defined by the majority as "feasible") accommodation."' Souter pointed out that
the employer defined its seniority system as one that was "'not intended to be a
134
contract"' and could be changed without notice. Justice Souter did not engage
in a treatise-like analysis of employee handbook law, but he could not resist this
aside: "[I]t is safe to say that the contract law of a number of jurisdictions would
treat this disclaimer as fatal to any claim an employee might make [for a
.... ,,131
conflicting reassignment accommodation] .
A reassignment for a disabled employee which competes with a
"noncontractual and modifiable at will" company policy must be seen as a
"reasonable" one which imposes no "undue hardship.' ' 36 What Souter's dissent
makes clear is that the majority selected certain rules of statutory construction in
order to reach a particular result.., one that narrows the Act's coverage.
Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) pointed to another consequence of
the majority's decision: that it invites more litigation because it requires case-
specific analysis. Scalia, of course, sought an even narrower interpretation of the
Act: the ADA clears away only obstacles arising from a person's disability and
nothing more.137 Be that as it may, Scalia is surely correct in his prediction that
"the Court's opinion leaves the question whether a seniority system must be
disregarded in order to accommodate a disabled employee in a state of
uncertainty that can be resolved only by constant litigation ....,,38
The business community celebrated U.S. Airways as a victory, just as it had
the decision in Toyota Motor. And certainly business interests have cause for
celebrating any case that restricts the reach of the ADA. However, as was true of
131. Id. at 1520.
132. Id. at 1533 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Title VII case the majority had
referenced in support of its approach was TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79-80 (1997) (an
accommodation requested pursuant to Title VII is not "reasonable" if it trumps other employees'
seniority rights). U.S. Airways, 122 S. Ct. at 1524. Justice Souter quoted the Senate Report as follows:
"'The Committee wishes to make it clear that the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in TWA
v. Harrison ... are not applicable to this legislation."' Id. (quoting S. Rpt. 101-16, at 36).
133. U.S. Airways, 122 S. Ct. at 1532 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1534.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1531 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). See Marcia Coyle, Disabled Workers Face Higher
Hurdle; A Finer Degree of "Reasonableness," Natl. L.J. Al (May 6, 2002) (citing members of the
practicing bar for the proposition that majority opinion invites more litigation and predicting that much
of it will focus on the newly-minted "special circumstances" test).
138. U.S. Airways, 122 S. Ct. at 1532.
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the Toyota Motor decision, U.S. Airways does little to close the courthouse door
to ADA litigation. While it did achieve the "right" result, and did so by way of an
argument couched, not in the activist terminology of policy, but in the restraint
language of (selected) rules of statutory construction, it did little or nothing to
stem the flood of litigation encouraged by an ambiguous statute.
C. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal
The third ADA case decided in the recent Supreme Court Term was
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal.'39 At issue was the "direct-threat" defense
provision of the ADA which states that a job qualification standard which includes
"'a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals in the workplace", 140 does not violate the Act if the
individual cannot perform the job safely with reasonable accommodation.14' Here,
we have an unambiguous provision in the ADA: "shall not pose a direct threat
to... others," which in plain meaning parlance seems with elegant simplicity and
clarity to mean what it says.
In Chevron, the issue was whether the unambiguous statement should be
expanded to include a direct threat to the health and safety of the disabled
individual. A unanimous Court held that it should. 142 The employer decision at
issue in Chevron was its refusal to hire the eponymous employee on the grounds
that his liver condition would be aggravated by exposure to the toxins at its
refinery.4 3 Chevron cited EEOC Rehabilitation Act regulations which extended
the statutory "direct-threat to others" defense to include a direct threat to
oneself.'" The Ninth Circuit compared the wording of the regulation with the
words of the statute and, relying on the plain meaning rule along with the canon
expressio unius exclusio alterius, found that the regulation exceeded the EEOC's
rulemaking authority. 45 Furthermore, it stated that the regulation was in conflict
with ADA's "policy against paternalism in the workplace.'
' 46
In reversing the Ninth Circuit's ruling, the Supreme Court viewed the
"direct-threat" defense as inclusive and illustrative rather than exclusive and
categorical and it interpreted the canon at issue, "espressio unius," as requiring "a
series of two or more ... things" from which the thing at issue is omitted.147 Thus,
139. 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002).
140. Id. at 2049 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b)).
141. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)).
142. Id. at 2048.
143. Id.
144. Chevron, 122 S. Ct. at 2046. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 105-220, § 408(a)(3),
112 Stat. 1202 (1998), as amended, is considered to be the "precursor" of the ADA. Thus Courts feel
free to rely on it in interpreting ambiguities in the ADA. The question is whether the "direct threat"
defense in the ADA was ambiguous.
145. Chevron, 122 S. Ct. at 2048-49.
146. Id. at 2048. The canon was defined in Chevron this way: "'expressing one item of [an]
associated group or series excluded another left unmentioned."' Id. at 2049 (quoting U.S. v. Vonn, 122
S. Ct. 1043, 1049 (2002)).
147. Id. at 2050.
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said the Court, this canon "properly applies only when in the natural association
of ideas in the mind of the reader that which is expressed is so set over by way of
strong contrast to that which is omitted that the contrast enforces the affirmative
inference."' 48 Moreover, the Court noted that in drafting the ADA provision at
issue Congress used the same language it had used in the Rehabilitation Act (the
direct-threat-to-others language) even though it was surely aware that the EEOC
had expanded the language to include a direct-threat-to-one's-self provision in its
Rehabilitation Act regulation. Because Congress did not comment on the
expansion, "[tihere is no way to tell" what Congress intended in the ADA."'
"Omitting the EEOC's reference to self-harm while using the very language that
the EEOC had read as consistent with recognizing self-harm is equivocal at best.
No negative inference is possible."' 150 The Court also employed a reductio ad
absurdum argument against the Ninth Circuit's expressio unius argument when it
queried, "If Typhoid Mary had come under the ADA, would a meat packer have
been defenseless if Mary sued after being turned away," simply because the
statute does not include harm to the public as a defense? 5 ' It rejected the Ninth
Circuit's paternalism argument because the ADA requires case-specific analysis
that precludes the kind of "pretextual stereoty[ping]" endemic to paternalism .
52
Critics of the decision remain unpersuaded and have argued that this decision is
illustrative of the kind of result-oriented approach the Court has taken with ADA
cases in its overweening attempt to restrict its availability. Here, for example, it
has reversed its normal course of relying on the plain meaning of the statute rather
than on EEOC interpretation in construing the statute's terms.
D. Barnes v. Gorman
In the fourth ADA case to come before the Court in the recent Term,
Barnes v. Gorman, the Court again conjoined provisions of the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act and found that remedies available under both Acts did not
include punitive damages. The case was brought in a somewhat unusual context: a
paraplegic arrestee suffered serious injuries when he was taken from his
wheelchair and strapped into a police van because the van in which he was being
transported had no wheelchair restraints.'54
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court and the trajectory of his
argument could have been anticipated. He stated Section 202 references the
148. Id. at 2050 (citations omitted).
149. Id.
150. Chevron, 122 S. Ct. at 2051.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2052.
153. See Marcia Coyle, Chevron ADA Case Before High Court; Employee's Own Safety Is the Issue at
Hand, Natl. L.J. A15 (Feb. 25, 2002) (quoting Peter Blanck, Director, University of Iowa's Law Health
Policy and Disability Center ("The high court in recent ADA rulings has not been particularly
deferential to the EEOC-to employers' advantage") and ("This court, led by justices like [Antonin]
Scalia, has been very literal in its reading of statutes .... In Chevron, the statute said what it means
and we'll see how principled the court will be")).
154. Barnes, 122 S. Ct. 2097.
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remedies section of the Rehabilitation Act and expressly adopts those remedies. 55
In turn, the remedies section of the Rehabilitation Act refers to the remedies
identified in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and adopts those remedies. 156 Courts
have consistently found that there is an implied private cause of action to enforce
the provisions of Title VI.'5 7 While the Supreme Court has previously declared
that "appropriate relief" is available "for violation of a federal right,"' 58 it has not
had occasion to set forth the requirements for relief available under Title VI.
Scalia addressed that issue by stating, first, that "Title VI invokes Congress's
power under the Spending Clause... and [that we] have repeatedly characterized
this statute and other Spending Clause legislation 'much in the nature of a
contract: in return for federal funds the [recipients] agree to comply with federally
imposed conditions.""59 In addition, punitive damages are generally not available
for breach of limited contract actions. Therefore, remedies sought in a cause of
action premised on contract doctrine are limited to contract remedies, as are
ADA remedies by way of the Rehabilitation Act, by way of Title VI.
Five Justices concurred in the result. Nevertheless, in Justice Souter's
concurring opinion, he pointed out that the reasoning upon which Scalia relied for
the holding ("federal statutes enacted pursuant to Congress' spending power
should be defined by the common law of contracts") was not even argued by the
parties."6 Conceptually, said Souter, there were three possible justifications for
excluding a punitive damage award in this case. The narrowest ground was that
ordinarily "municipalities are not subject to punitive damages.' 6' A somewhat
broader rationale (broader, in that it looks not just at the class of defendants in a
particular ADA case where an arm or agency of the state is the putative defendant
but at all ADA cases) was the rationale argued by the parties: Congress didn't
authorize punitive damage awards in ADA and Rehabilitation Act cases. But
Scalia's rationale goes well beyond that approach to bar punitive damages from all
cases claiming violation of federal statutes which were enacted pursuant to
Congress's Spending Clause power. Souter declared, "There is... no justification
for the Court's decision to reach out and decide the case on a broader ground that
was not argued below., 162 Despite that fact, Justice Scalia availed himself of the
opportunity to narrow remedies not only in ADA cases, but, indeed, across a very
broad statutory spectrum.
155. Id. at 2100.
156. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12133).
157. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (2000)). Title VI "prohibits racial discrimination in federally
funded programs" and provides an implied private cause of action to enforce its provisions. Id.
158. Id. (citing Cannon v. U. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979)).
159. Barnes, 122 S. Ct. at 2100 (citing U.S. Const., art 1, § 8, cl. 1 and quoting Pennhurst St. Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)).
160. Id. at 2104 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
161. Id. at 2103.
162. Id. at 2104.
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III. CONCLUSION
Employer interests prevailed in most of the Court's employment cases this
Term. This article has reviewed a few of them. Aside from the Tenth Circuit
affirmative action case, Adarand, which was included for its local appeal, the
selected cases illustrate how the Court has narrowed the protective reach of the
ADA. This Term's ADA cases are emblematic not only of the Court's pro-
employer proclivities but also of the judicial means by which it achieves pro-
employer results. A pattern has emerged, in recent Terms, whereby the Court
uses ostensibly technical rules of statutory interpretation to expand the reach of its
most controversial and ideological decisions.
One way to state the fundamental public policy at issue in all of these cases is
this: What is the proper and most beneficial way to accommodate impaired
individuals in society-in the workplace or through public welfare? An activist
Supreme Court has gone a long way toward deciding that public policy in recent
Terms. Since 1999, the Court has narrowed the ADA in many respects. First,
remedies now exclude the catalyst theory for purposes of fee-shifting statutes and
punitive damages, in any case, are not available; second, the class of putative
defendants now excludes state employers; third, the class of plaintiffs has been
narrowed in several significant respects including (a) the kinds of disabilities
amenable to accommodation, and (b) the kinds of accommodation available to
impaired employees. We may legitimately inquire whether this is the best way to
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